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RISE OF THE ROBOT LAWYERS? 
Milan Markovic* 
The advent of artificial intelligence has provoked considerable speculation about 
the future of the American workforce, including highly educated professionals such 
as lawyers and doctors. Although most commentators are alarmed by the prospect 
of intelligent machines displacing millions of workers, this is not so with respect to 
the legal sector. Media accounts and some legal scholars envision a future where 
intelligent machines perform the bulk of legal work, and legal services are less 
expensive and more accessible. This future is purportedly at hand as lawyers 
struggle to compete with technologically savvy alternative legal service providers. 
This Article challenges the notion that lawyers will be displaced by artificial 
intelligence on both empirical and normative grounds. Most legal tasks are 
inherently abstract and cannot be performed by even advanced artificial intelligence 
relying on deep-learning techniques. In addition, lawyer employment and wages 
have grown steadily over the last twenty years, evincing that the legal profession 
has benefited from new technologies, as it has throughout its history. Lastly, were 
large-scale automation of legal work possible, core societal values would counsel 
against it. These values are not merely aspirational but are reflected in the multi-
faceted role of lawyers and in the way that the legal system is structured. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists and legal scholars have long speculated about technology’s 
impact on the labor market.1 The United States was sufficiently concerned about 
workforce automation and the potential displacement of American workers that 
President Johnson commissioned a blue-ribbon panel on the topic in 1964.2 The 
hollowing out of the American manufacturing industry is due predominately to 
automation in the form of manufacturing robots.3 
The advent of advanced artificial intelligence systems has raised the 
prospect that white-collar workers may be as susceptible to automation as their blue-
collar counterparts.4 A recent report by McKinsey Consulting suggests that half of 
all activities performed by American workers could be automated using available 
technologies.5 Other observers offer lower estimates but acknowledge that millions 
of jobs could be lost, many of which may never be replaced.6 If media coverage is 
any guide, we are rapidly nearing a future where most jobs, including those of 
lawyers and doctors, will belong to robots.7 
                                                                                                                
 1. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our 
Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 325 (2010) (“We are being afflicted with a new 
disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name, but of which they will hear 
a great deal in the years to come—namely, technological unemployment.”); DAVID RICARDO, 
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 393 (2001) (“[T]he substitution 
of machinery for human labour, is often very injurious to the interests of the class of 
labourers.”). 
 2. See David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and 
Future of Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3–4 (2015). 
 3. See MICHAEL J. HICKS & SRIKRANT DEVARAJ, THE MYTH AND REALITY OF 
MANUFACTURING IN AMERICA 6 (2017), https://conexus.cberdata.org/files/MfgReality.pdf. 
 4. See Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots be Lawyers? Computers, 
Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 503 (2017). 
 5. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, 
EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/Digital%20Disruption/
Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/A-future-that-works-
Full-report-MGI-January-2017.ashx. 
 6. See Ljubica Nedelkoska & Glenda Quintini, Automation, Skills Use and 
Training 7 (OECD Soc., Emp. and Migration, Working Papers No. 202, 2017), 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/2e2f4eea-en.pdf?expires=1552176316&id=id
&accname=guest&checksum=261F4CA439211DFE24014E9DE2D52E0E (suggesting that 
14% of jobs are at high risk of automation). 
 7. See, e.g., Harold Stark, Prepare Yourself, Robots Will Soon Replace Doctors 
in Healthcare, FORBES (July 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldstark/2017/07/10/prepare-yourselves-robots-will-soon-
replace-doctors-in-healthcare/#7cd4da4e52b5; John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers 
Replaced by Cheap Software, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/science/05legal.html. 
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What has been lost amidst these prognostications is that automation is not 
merely a matter of technological capacity.8 In some situations, it would be 
impractical or prohibitively expensive to replace human workers with machines.9 
Public attitudes are also relevant. Americans continue to work as bank tellers and in 
customer service although machines can perform many of the tasks associated with 
these positions.10 Unsurprisingly, most human beings prefer to interact and conduct 
business with other humans. 
To conceive of automation as antithetical to labor also overlooks that most 
technologies are labor augmenting.11 Technological developments allow workers to 
devote their time to higher-order tasks, leading to increased productivity and 
boosting employment and wages.12 For example, IBM’s much-publicized Watson 
computer aids doctors in diagnosing patients, enabling them to see more patients 
and devise better treatments.13 
The legal sector is a particularly interesting case study. Although 
automation has engendered alarm in other contexts, it has been welcomed in law.14 
Part of the reason may be that Americans tend to hold negative views of the legal 
profession.15 However, a number of legal scholars maintain that intelligent machines 
will lower the cost of legal services and make it far easier for Americans to obtain 
legal representation.16 The automation of legal work is allegedly very much in 
progress. Daniel Katz writes: 
                                                                                                                
 8. See Nedelkoska & Quintini, supra note 6, at 68–70. 
 9. See MANYIKA, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
 10. See id. at 68.  
 11. See generally James A. Kahn & Jong-Soo Lin, Skilled Labor-Augmenting 
Technological Progress in U.S. Manufacturing, 113 Q. J. ECON. 1281, 1281 (1998) (defining 
“labor-augmenting technological progress” as an increase in the effective labor input of 
skilled workers). 
 12. See id.; see also Daron Acemoglu, Labor-and Capital-Augmenting Technical 
Change, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1, 4 (2003) (suggesting that labor-augmenting role of 
technology follows from profit-making incentives). 
 13. See generally David H. Freeman, A Reality Check for IBM’s AI Ambitions, 
MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/607965/a-
reality-check-for-ibms-ai-ambitions/ (describing progress and challenges of Watson in 
healthcare). Watson has received negative publicity recently for botching diagnoses and 
suggesting life-threatening treatments. See, e.g., Anne Palmer, IBM’s Watson AI Suggested 
‘Often Inaccurate’ and ‘Unsafe’ Treatment Recommendations for Cancer Patients, Internal 
Documents Show, DAILY MAIL (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-6001141/IBMs-Watson-suggested-
inaccurate-unsafe-treatment-recommendations-cancer-patients.html. 
 14. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 502–03. 
 15. See, e.g., Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational 
Approach to Law Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601, 604 (2016); Leonard E. Gross, The 
Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1415–17 (1999) 
(documenting the public’s low opinion of lawyers from the 1930s to the 1990s, 
notwithstanding that clients seem to appreciate their own lawyers). 
 16. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: 
MORE TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 195 (2017); John O. 
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The bundle of skills associated with the practice of law falls on a 
continuum where a number of basic tasks have already been displaced 
by computation, automation, and “soft” artificial intelligence. Faced 
with cost pressures, clients and law firms are leveraging legal 
information technology to either automate or semi-automate tasks 
previously performed by teams of lawyers. Like many industries 
before it, the march of automation, process engineering, informatics, 
and supply chain management will continue to operate and transform 
our industry.17 
The legal sector is somewhat opaque in its operations. Yet, as this Article 
shall seek to demonstrate, lawyers should not fear artificial intelligence’s rise. 
Lawyers are increasingly reliant on technology, but there is limited evidence that 
intelligent machines are performing even basic legal tasks without human 
assistance, and higher-order tasks will remain beyond intelligent machines’ 
capabilities for the foreseeable future. New avenues of legal work are also being 
created as society becomes increasingly reliant on artificial intelligence. 
Part I of this Article contends that the notion that most legal work can be 
automated fails to consider artificial intelligence’s limitations and lawyers’ day-to-
day activities. As set out in Part II, employment and wage data also refute that 
lawyers are being replaced by machines. Even where automation may be possible, 
Part III maintains that important and deep-seated societal values may counsel against 
it. These values are not merely aspirational but are reflected in the multi-faceted role 
of lawyers and in the way that the legal system is structured. More than most other 
workers, lawyers are well-positioned to thrive alongside the machines. 
I. AUTOMATION, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 
A. The Potential and Limitations of Artificial Intelligence 
Technology has allowed for the automation of many activities that were 
once performed by human workers. The jobs that have historically been most 
vulnerable to automation consist of routine and repetitive tasks.18 Although this 
dichotomy has been framed in terms of education and skill, some blue-collar jobs 
consist primarily of nonroutine tasks, and some white-collar jobs consist 
predominately of observing step-by-step procedures.19 For example, many 
                                                                                                                
McGinnis & Russel G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will 
Transfer the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 
3055 (2014). But see Milan Markovic, Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal 
Market, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 75–77 (2017) (noting the limits of technology in 
addressing the justice gap). 
 17. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction— Or— How I Learned 
to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 910–11 (2013) (citations omitted). 
 18. Autor, supra note 2, at 12. 
 19. See, e.g., Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of 
Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECHNOLOGICAL 
FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 255 (2017); David H. Autor & David Dorn, The Growth 
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construction jobs involve nonroutine work and cannot be automated easily whereas 
various office jobs, such as loan underwriting, rely on predetermined procedures and 
can already be automated.20 Consistent with this dichotomy, the number of people 
employed in nonroutine jobs has increased steadily for decades whereas the number 
employed in routine jobs has been flat.21 
The term “artificial intelligence” originated in 1956.22 Although definitions 
of artificial intelligence vary, the term is generally associated with the automation 
of intelligent behavior via computer processes.23 Modern artificial intelligence 
systems operate by using algorithms to detect patterns in data; on the basis of these 
patterns, they discern rules that are used to make assessments that resemble those 
made by humans.24 The classification of email as spam is a simple example.25 After 
being trained on millions of emails, a spam filter is able to identify key 
characteristics that are associated with spam emails and quarantine emails that 
demonstrate those characteristics.26 
More advanced artificial intelligence systems consist of vast artificial 
neural networks that make connections in their network via probabilistic 
inferences.27 As they are exposed to more data, these systems engage in “deep 
learning” and reassess these connections so that they are more fine-tuned to the data 
in question.28 Marvin Minsky and Herbert Simon were among the first thinkers to 
predict that intelligent machines would eventually master any work that humans 
could do.29 While these predictions have proven overly optimistic, intelligent 
machines are expected to match—or surpass—humans in activities such as driving 
in the years ahead.30 
                                                                                                                
of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
1553, 1559 (2013) (“[T]echnological progress . . . greatly reduces the cost of accomplishing 
routine, codifiable job tasks but has a comparatively minor impact on the cost of performing 
in-person service tasks.”). 
 20. MANYIKA, supra note 5, at 13. 
 21. See Maximiliano Dvorkin, Jobs Involving Routine Tasks Aren’t Growing, FED. 
RES. BANK ST. LOUIS: ON THE ECONOMY (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-
economy/2016/january/jobs-involving-routine-tasks-arent-growing. 
 22. See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH 3 (1995). 
 23. Id. at 5 (citation omitted). 
 24. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89–91 
(2014). 
 25. Id. at 90. 
 26. Id. at 91. 
 27. See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 
NATURE 436, 441 (2015). 
 28. See id. at 438. 
 29. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Artificial Intelligence, Automation 
and Work 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 24196, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24196.  
 30. Erik Brynjolfsson, Tom Mitchell & Daniel Rock, What Can Machines Learn 
and What Does It Mean For Occupations and the Economy? 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 43, 
43 (2018). 
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Thus far, the artificial intelligence’s economic effects have been modest.31 
However, unlike other technological advances that have generally made workers 
more productive and increased demand for labor, there is growing concern that 
intelligent machines will displace workers and drive down wages.32 Prognosticators 
warn of a “jobless future”33 and “the end of work.”34 In this veritable dystopia, the 
only economic winners will allegedly be those who own, control, and service the 
machines.35 
Notwithstanding artificial intelligence’s rapid development, intelligent 
machines have significant limitations that popular discourse has ignored. As 
complex as a task such as driving may appear to be, it involves fixed rules and 
pattern recognition and therefore can be learned by machines.36 Many other tasks 
fall outside of this paradigm. David Autor writes: 
One category includes tasks that require problem-solving capabilities, 
intuition, creativity, and persuasion. These tasks, which we term 
“abstract,” are characteristic of professional, technical, and 
managerial occupations . . . they place a premium on inductive 
reasoning, communications ability, and expert mastery. The second 
broad category includes tasks requiring situational adaptability, 
visual and language recognition, and in-person interactions—which 
we call “manual” tasks. Manual tasks are characteristic of food 
preparation and serving jobs, cleaning and janitorial work, grounds 
cleaning and maintenance, in-person health assistance by home 
health aides, and numerous jobs in security and protective services.37 
To overcome artificial intelligence’s limitations with respect to abstract and 
manual tasks, there is growing consensus that artificial intelligence may have to 
jettison the deep-learning techniques upon which it is based.38 Current research is 
only in the nascent phase of “reverse engineering” the human brain so that machines 
                                                                                                                
 31. Id. 
 32. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 29, at 1. Self-driving cars alone could cost 
the United States over 5 million jobs. See Steven Greenhouse, Autonomous Vehicles Could 
Cost America 5 Million Jobs. What Should We Do About It?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 
4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-greenhouse-driverlessjob-loss-
20160922-snap-story.html. 
 32. MANYIKA, supra note 5, at 13. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL 
LABOR FORCE AND DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA (1995); Ji Shisan, The End of Work?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/the-end-of-
work.html. 
 35. See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and 
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254 (2018). 
 36. Surden, supra note 24, at 99. 
 37. Autor, supra note 2, at 12. 
 38. See generally James Somers, Is AI Riding A One-Trick Pony?, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608911/is-ai-riding-a-one-trick-
pony/ (noting that artificial intelligence is based on techniques that are over thirty years old 
and that progress has plateaued). 
2019] ROBOT LAWYERS 331 
can begin to make the type of judgments that humans make intuitively and on the 
basis of limited data in completing manual and abstract tasks.39 Rather than 
contemplating artificial intelligence induced “joblessness,” society would be better 
off identifying and cultivating the skills that are likely to be in demand in the 
economy of the future.40 
B. Automating Legal Work 
As highly educated professionals whose work involves “problem-
solving . . . intuition, creativity and persuasion,” as well as written and verbal 
communication, lawyers would seem to be poor candidates for automation.41 
Nevertheless, media accounts and a growing number of legal scholars have focused 
on the threat that artificial intelligence poses to the legal profession.42 For example, 
John McGinnis and Russell Pearce have argued that the ability of intelligent 
machines to perform core legal tasks, such as document discovery, legal research, 
document drafting, and the prediction of case outcomes, will reduce demand for 
lawyers drastically.43 
The notion that technology can supplant lawyers predates artificial 
intelligence. At one time, commentators speculated that technologies such as the 
typewriter would revolutionize legal practice and threaten attorney livelihoods by 
simplifying legal drafting, from which attorneys had derived much of their 
incomes.44 The legal profession was able to survive the typewriter as well as other 
impactful technologies.45 For example, until the advent of Westlaw’s Keycite in the 
                                                                                                                
 39. Joshua B. Tenenbaum et al., How to Grow A Mind: Statistics, Structure, and 
Abstraction, 331 SCI. 1279, 1283–84 (2011). One of the stubborn obstacles to the adoption of 
automated vehicles is that they are not as adept as human drivers at predicting pedestrian 
behavior. See Amir Rasouli & John K. Tsotsos, Autonomous Vehicles that Interact with 
Pedestrians: A Survey of Theory and Practice, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSP. 
SYSTEMS (May 30, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.11773.pdf (“Recent field studies of 
autonomous vehicles show how the lack of social understanding can result in traffic accidents 
or erratic behaviors towards pedestrians.”). 
 40. See Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 30, at 44 (“[A] shift is needed in the debate 
about the effects of AI on work: away from the common focus on full automation of many 
jobs and pervasive occupational replacement toward the redesign of jobs. . . .”); Acemoglu & 
Restrepo, supra note 29, at 1559 (postulating a mismatch between future employment 
opportunities and the skills of the available workforce). 
 41. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 42. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 506 (collecting examples from this genre). 
 43. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 16, at 3047–53. More recent focus has been 
on Blockchain and its potential to replace lawyer intermediaries (on the assumption that 
Blockchain is widely adopted). See Mark Fenwick et al., Legal Education in the Blockchain 
Revolution, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 351, 359 (2017). These authors define “Blockchain” 
as “a shared digital ledger or database that maintains a continuously growing list of 
transactions among participating parties regarding digital assets. . . .” Id. at 366. 
 44. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 275 (2014). 
 45. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 503 (“The Internet, email, and legal 
research databases like Westlaw and Lexis have been impacting and altering legal practice 
for decades.”). 
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late 1990s, attorneys would bill for time spent in library stacks ascertaining whether 
cited authorities constituted “good law;”46 now overruled or superseded authorities 
are flagged electronically because of computerized research.47 The finalizing of 
legal memoranda was also a laborious endeavor prior to word processing. Lawyers 
would draft tables of authority manually and would have to set their briefs in 
linotype and take them to commercial printers.48 Improvements in technology 
ultimately facilitated and improved lawyers’ representation of their clients by 
enabling lawyers to spend less time on ministerial tasks. 
Artificial intelligence’s potential impact on the law was first raised in a law 
review article written in 1970.49 Although the authors considered artificial 
intelligence merely a potential “aid[] in the process of legal reasoning,”50 the 
technology now has many practical applications. For example, artificial intelligence 
can simplify legal research by identifying authorities that are frequently referenced 
with respect to a particular proposition of law.51 It can also assist with contract 
drafting by highlighting provisions that are apt to appear in certain types of 
contracts.52 
Another promising field is legal analytics. Legal analytics is an application 
of artificial intelligence that makes probabilistic predictions in a matter based on 
similar, previously concluded matters.53 The more data to which artificial 
intelligence systems are exposed, the better their ability to predict potential 
outcomes, whether they pertain to the likelihood of prevailing at trial, settlement 
value, or legal fees expended.54 
To complete all of the aforementioned tasks, artificial intelligence requires 
substantial input and training from lawyers.55 The dichotomy between routine and 
                                                                                                                
 46. See Debra Baker, The Enemy is in their Cites, 84 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (1998) 
(noting that citation checking required “hours in library stacks”). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See William T. Braithwaite, How is Technology Affecting the Practice and 
Profession of Law?, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1113, 1132 (1991). 
 49. Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation About Artificial 
Intelligence and Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40, 60 (1970). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Surden, supra note 24, at 89–90. 
 52. See William E. Forster & Andrew L. Lawson, When to Praise the Machine: 
The Promise and Perils of Automated Transactional Drafting, 69 S.C. L. REV. 597, 621–22 
(2018). 
 53. “Legal analytics use big data, algorithms, and AI to make predictions from or 
detect trends in large data sets.” Gary E. Marchant, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of 
Legal Practice, 14 SCITECH LAW. 20, 30 (2017). 
 54. See Surden, supra note 24, at 96. 
 55. See generally Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 522 (“When a user builds a new 
system, much of the language-parsing module is prepackaged. But the retrieval and ranking 
neural nets must be trained through supervised learning, and so, like Westlaw and Lexis, 
require a substantial initial effort.”). 
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nonroutine work is salient here.56 There is a world of difference between locating an 
authority for a basic proposition of law versus identifying an authority that best 
advances a client’s position in litigation. Similarly, the mere fact that employment 
contracts often feature standardized noncompete clauses does not mean that such 
clauses can, and should be, included in all employees’ contracts or that they will be 
enforceable.57 Many legal problems are not conducive to “one-size-fits-all” 
solutions and will require some lawyer involvement.58 
In terms of legal prediction, artificial intelligence will likely complement 
lawyers without necessarily making litigation any less frequent.59 The most 
sophisticated artificial intelligence system can be led astray if it does not have access 
to the “right” data.60 For an intelligent machine to be able to predict the outcome of 
a case or regulatory action, lawyers must conduct a thorough investigation of a 
matter’s particulars and collect information about similar matters before the same 
fact-finder or administrator.61 
Prediction is less complex when there is a fixed record and reliable 
evidence of past outcomes—as there is when a case reaches the Supreme Court of 
the United States—but machines cannot determine definitively the set of precedents 
upon which a court (or agency) is likely to rely.62 Precedents can also be cabined, 
revisited, or overruled. The fact-intensive nature of most legal disputes, the constant 
promulgation of new laws and regulations, and the presence of substantial legal 
indeterminacy all complicate legal analysis and prediction.63 It may also be in the 
                                                                                                                
 56. McGinnis and Pearce concede that there will be “superstar” lawyers in the 
automated legal future who will continue to practice much as they do today. See McGinnis & 
Pearce, supra note 16, at 3054–55. 
 57. As Professor Bishara has noted, “Despite some agreed-upon basic principles 
of how these restrictive covenants are reviewed by most state courts, there nonetheless exists 
no truly uniform approach across jurisdictions determining exactly what sorts of factors are 
sufficient to support an employer’s claims for injunctive relief.” Norman D. Bishara, Fifty 
Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, 
and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 757 (2011). 
 58. Deficient one-size-fits-all legal solutions also strain the legal system. See, e.g., 
Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2018) (noting mistreatment of retirement funds in wills created by 
LegalZoom); Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 867, 884–90 (2013) 
(examining cases pertaining to robo-signing and the foreclosure crisis). 
 59. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 16, at 3053. 
 60. One particular issue is whether to provide access to unpublished cases, which 
often differ from published ones. For a discussion of implicit bias in artificial intelligence, 
see Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias 
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 583–85 (2018), examining possible sources of bias. 
 61. Surden, supra note 24, at 104–05; see also Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 
524–25 (noting the difficulty of predicting judicial and jury decision-making). 
 62. See Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 339, 346 (1996) (suggesting that to change the law lawyers need only identify a 
“background rule” that, once put into play, can provide the basis for an entirely different legal 
rule). 
 63. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 519. For a discussion of the indeterminacy 
thesis in law, see, for example, Milan Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical Legal Studies 
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self-interest of parties to direct their attorneys to litigate in instances where the 
analytics suggest that they should not.64 
A recent study by Dana Remus and Frank Levy of large- and medium-sized 
law firms’ billings sheds light on intelligent machines’ potential to displace 
lawyers.65 Remus and Levy determined that lawyers spend little time on discovery 
and other automatable activities; most attorney time is allocated to legal strategy and 
analysis, client advising, fact investigation, negotiations, and court appearances.66 
Even ardent futurists have conceded that these activities are beyond the capabilities 
of intelligent machines and that they are unlikely to supplant lawyers with respect 
to these functions.67  
Another key insight from the Remus and Levy study is that the nature of 
legal work is not static. The adoption of artificial intelligence in discovery, for 
example, has created other avenues of legal work.68 Lawyers spend less time 
reviewing documents for production purposes than they have in the past but spend 
                                                                                                                
and the Torture Memos, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 148–50 (2011); Tushnet, supra note 62, at 
341. Of course, not all legal work involves indeterminacy, and some lawyers’ practices 
consist partly of writing form contracts and “cookie-cutter” briefs. However, these tactics 
tend to be confined to narrow practice areas and are highly controversial insofar as they do 
not take into account the specific circumstances of a client’s situation. See, e.g., Landis v. 
Fannie Mae, 922 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (chastising attorney for filing 
cookie-cutter complaints and briefs on behalf of defendants in foreclosure proceedings); 
Fobare v. Weiss, No. 99-CV-1452, 2000 WL 654969, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2000) 
(admonishing attorney for engaging in the “cookie-cutter” practice of law and failing to 
undertake a reasonable inquiry into his client’s claims); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1546 (2009) (suggesting that 
“settlement mills” are law firms that are characterized by high volumes of cases and cookie-
cutter assembly-line procedures). 
 64. Clients may rationally choose to litigate although the prospect of prevailing is 
low. Litigation may confer a business advantage, for example, or may serve the public 
interest. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 875–76 (1990) (noting that litigation to secure a business 
advantage is “commonplace”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee-
Shifting, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (noting public-interest rationale). 
 65. Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 529–30. 
 66. See id. at 532–33. 
 67. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 58 (2013) 
(conceding that technology cannot replace oral advocates); Tom C. Lin, National Pastimes, 
55 B.C.L. REV. 1197, 1205 (2014) (“A lawyer’s critical skills of counsel and persuasion seem 
unlikely to ever be outsourced, in whole or in part, to machines.”). A cognitive scientist 
explained recently in an interview with the MIT Technology Review: “It’s not that computers 
can’t replace lawyers because lawyers do really complicated things. It’s because lawyers read 
and talk to people. It’s not like we’re close. We’re so far.” Somers, supra note 38 (quoting 
Eyal Dechter). 
 68. Katz concedes that artificial intelligence will create work in other areas for 
attorneys but appears to assume that most lawyers lack the skills that will be in demand in the 
data-driven future. See Katz, supra note 17, at 964. This does not mean, of course, that they 
cannot acquire them; lawyers have strong cognitive and social skills that are integral to the 
contemporary economy. 
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more time familiarizing themselves with their clients’ data and negotiating and 
contesting document-review protocols.69 Lucrative practice specialties, such as 
cybersecurity and data privacy, would have been unimaginable a generation ago but 
are integral to today’s data-driven economy.70 
In light of the varied and evolving set of tasks carried out by attorneys, it 
should come as no surprise that artificial intelligence researchers have 
predominately regarded lawyers as relatively immune from automation. In their 
influential 2016 paper, Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne estimate that lawyers 
have only a 3.5% risk of automation—far less than computer programmers, 
petroleum engineers, and reporters, among other professionals.71 Other empirical 
accounts are in accordance.72 This literature has received minimal attention from 
legal scholars who have chosen to focus on document discovery and other discrete 
legal tasks where artificial intelligence has had a major impact.73 But lawyers have 
proven resistant to automation throughout their history, and the automation of 
certain routine types of legal work is hardly evidence that attorneys’ core tasks will 
soon be performed by intelligent machines.74 
II. EVIDENCE OF AUTOMATION IN THE LEGAL MARKET 
As described in the previous Part, much of what is known about artificial 
intelligence suggests that it will not displace attorneys. Nevertheless, technology is 
improving continuously, and it is conceivable that lawyers devote more time to 
                                                                                                                
 69. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 517–18; see also Benjamin L. S. Ritz, 
Will This Dog Hunt?: An Attorney’s Guide to Predictive Coding, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 345, 374 
(2016) (noting cases where the costs of motion practice far exceeded the savings from the 
adoption of predictive-coding protocols). 
 70. See, e.g., Allison Grande, Growing Privacy Laws Raise GCs’ Fears of Legal 
Exposure, LAW 360 (Nov. 15, 2018, 11:04 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/legalindustry/articles/1102301/growing-privacy-laws-raise-gcs-
fears-of-legal-exposure. 
 71. Frey & Osborne, supra note 19, at 269–72. 
 72. See Autor & Dorn, supra note 19, at 1559; David J. Deming, The Growing 
Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 
No. 21473, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21473.pdf; see also Daron Acemoglu & 
David Autor, Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings, 4 
HANDBOOK LAB. ECON. 1043, 1076–77 (2011) (noting that difficult-to-automate abstract 
tasks are “characteristic of professional . . . occupations, such as law . . . [and] 
medicine . . . .”). 
 73. See, e.g., Katz, supra 17, at 936–40 (describing the Supreme Court Forecasting 
Project and private analytics company Lex Machina); William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for 
Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 489 (2013) (describing the profitability and visibility of legal-
document provider LegalZoom). But see JOANNA GOODMAN, ROBOTS IN LAW ii (2016) 
(suggesting that lawyers may benefit from artificial intelligence more than other professionals 
because it could free them from the burdens of process work and enable them to refocus on 
their core functions). 
 74. See Brook E. Gotberg, Technically Bankrupt, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 111, 
116 (2017) (describing consensus that artificial intelligence will not come for lawyers 
“anytime soon”). 
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routine tasks than assumed, rendering them vulnerable to automation.75 Scholars 
have referenced, inter alia, falling pay for newer lawyers and the rise of alternative 
legal service providers to argue that technology is already disrupting the legal 
market and shifting legal work away from lawyers.76 
To measure automation’s effects in a given industry, economists assess the 
relationship between productivity and employment.77 Employment and wages have 
traditionally increased with productivity; however, partly due to automation, 
productivity has grown in certain industries while workers’ incomes and job 
prospects have faltered.78 Automation is labor displacing when it causes a 
“decoupling” between productivity on the one hand and employment and wages on 
the other.79 
The manufacturing industry is a dramatic example of labor-displacing 
automation.80 Table 1 illustrates that manufacturing output has increased steadily 
since the late 1980s while employment has fallen precipitously.81 Unsurprisingly, 
real wages in manufacturing have also fallen over this same period, with workers in 
manufacturing now earning less than other goods-producing workers.82 
                                                                                                                
 75. See SUSSKIND, supra note 67, at 109 (“In the long run, increasing amounts of 
legal work can and will be taken on by advanced computer systems, with a light hand on the 
tiller from the human beings who are their users.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 73, at 482–83. “Disruption theory” was 
coined by Harvard Business School’s Clayton Christensen and refers to a process whereby a 
smaller company with few resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent 
businesses by serving an overlooked market and then extending its reach to the incumbents. 
See Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What Is Disruptive 
Innovation?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-
innovation. Numerous acolytes have sought to apply his theory to the law. See, e.g., Michele 
R. Pistone & John Hoeffner, No Path but One: Law School Survival in an Age of Disruptive 
Technology, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 193 (2013); Ray W. Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and 
Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2012). 
 77. See Amy Bernstein & Anand Raman, The Great Decoupling: An Interview 
with Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2015), 
https://hbr.org/2015/06/the-great-decoupling. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 29, at 1. 
 80. See HICKS & DEVRAJ, supra note 3, at 6. 
 81. Author’s calculations drawn from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”), 
Manufacturing Sector: Real Output and All Employees: Manufacturing, FRED, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OUTMS (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
 82. See Catherine Ruckelshaus & Sarah Leberstein, Manufacturing Low Pay: 
Declining Wages in the Jobs That Built America’s Middle Class, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 6–
7 (Nov. 2014), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Manufacturing-Low-Pay-
Declining-Wages-Jobs-Built-Middle-Class.pdf. 
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Table 1 
 
To assess whether similar trends are present in the legal market, Table 2 
uses Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) data to track full-time employment among 
all legal occupations, as well as among lawyers and certain nonlawyer subgroups.83 
If automation has been labor displacing rather than labor augmenting in the legal 
sector, we would expect to see job losses or at least flat employment.84 
Table 2 
 
                                                                                                                
 83.  Author’s calculations drawn from Occupational Employment and Wages, 
May 2017: 23-0000 Legal Occupations (Major Group), BUREAU LAB. STAT, 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes230000.htm (last visited March 30, 2019). BLS 
employment data does not include legal workers, including lawyers, who may be self-
employed. Thus, the data does not include law-firm partners and solo practitioners. See 
Occupational Employment and Wages May 2018, BUREAU LAB. STAT, 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes230000.htm (last visited March 30, 2019). 
 84.  See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 29, at 11. 
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Two main trends emerge from Table 2. First, full-time employment in law 
increased by approximately 340,000 from 2000 to 2017. Although growth was not 
even throughout this period, with declines between 2002 and 2003 and again 
between 2015 and 2016, on the whole, the legal sector has added substantial 
numbers of jobs in stark contrast to industries such as manufacturing that have been 
wracked by automation. 
Second, Table 2 demonstrates that employment growth was not distributed 
evenly among legal occupations. Lawyer positions represent the majority of legal 
jobs created; there were approximately 227,000 more lawyers in 2017 than in 2000. 
The number of paralegal positions also increased significantly (by 116,000).85 Court 
and municipal clerks86 and miscellaneous workers—e.g., legal secretaries and other 
support personnel—experienced declines in employment. The declines were 
particularly precipitous after the 2008 recession. On January 1, 2017, there were 
approximately 13,000 fewer court clerks and 42,000 fewer “miscellaneous” legal 
workers than there were on January 1, 2008, while the number of lawyers grew by 
136,000 over this time period. These occupations’ divergent fates follow from the 
dichotomy introduced above: clerks and other support staff, unlike their lawyer 
counterparts, generally engage in routine tasks and can have their functions 
automated. 87 
The heterogeneity in legal market employment has been overlooked by 
some scholars. For example, William Henderson relies on census data to argue that 
lawyers are being replaced by technology as part of a fundamental restructuring of 
the legal services industry.88 To support this claim, he notes that that employment in 
U.S. law offices fell by approximately 47,000 from 2004 to 2010, whereas 
employment in “all other legal services” grew by nearly 8,000.89 However, census 
data does not distinguish lawyer and nonlawyer employment in law offices, and 
Henderson concedes that it is ultimately speculation that lawyers have suffered the 
steepest job losses.90 
As Table 2 indicates, contrary to Henderson’s supposition, lawyer 
employment has grown steadily, including after the 2008 recession, whereas 
nonlawyer employment (other than paralegals) has not. The recession undeniably 
affected lawyers, but layoffs were mostly limited to large corporate law firms that 
                                                                                                                
 85. This is surprising because scholars have claimed that paralegals are highly 
susceptible to automation. See Osborne & Frey, supra note 19, at 267. 
 86. This category does not include judicial law clerks. 
 87. See also Nir Jaimovich & Henry E. Siu, The Trend is the Cycle: Job 
Polarization and Jobless Recoveries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Papers 18334, 
2012), 
https://econ.tau.ac.il/sites/economy.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/Economics/PDF/2014%20se
minars/Jaimovich_Siu_2014.pdf (demonstrating that middle-skill jobs that involve routine 
work are lost mostly during recessions and never fully recover). 
 88. See William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 5, 12 (2013). 
 89. Id. at 8. 
 90. Id. at 8 n.1. 
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employ a relatively small percentage of practicing attorneys.91 Legal employers such 
as governments and corporations also do not appear in the above census data and 
may have been better positioned to weather the recession.92 Many of the attorneys 
who separated from private firms during the recession transitioned to positions in 
smaller firms, government, and industry.93 
Henderson may be correct that the growth of employment in “other legal 
services” is an important harbinger for the legal market.94 However, the “other legal 
services” sector consists of a number of different types of businesses, including 
patent agent services, jury consultants, notary publics,95 and alternative legal service 
providers (ALSPs).96 It is unclear if these types of businesses truly compete with 
lawyer-owned firms, let alone constitute a threat to attorneys’ livelihoods. For 
example, the largest ALSPs currently compliment traditional firms by employing 
temporary attorneys and facilitating large-scale document reviews.97 
Stagnation of attorney wages would also constitute evidence that 
automation is displacing attorneys. Yet, as demonstrated in Table 3, the legal 
services industry as a whole has seen wage growth that far exceeds that of domestic 
private industries generally.98 The average full-time worker in a law firm saw his or 
her income grow from $56,000 in 1998 to $99,000 in 2016, with lawyers seeing 
                                                                                                                
 91. The recession predominately affected hiring at the largest U.S. law firms. See, 
e.g., Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New 
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 543 (2014); Gary A. Munneke, 
Recessionary Road, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 43, 44 (2009) (“[T]he recession has not been as tough 
on solos and small firms as it has for the large firms we read about in the legal press.”); see 
also Milan Markovic & Gabriele Plickert, Attorneys’ Career Dissatisfaction in the New 
Normal, 25 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 147, 162 (2018) (noting that most attorneys in private 
practice work for firms with five or fewer attorneys). 
 92. The data also does not include solo practitioners who do not incorporate their 
practices. See Total Employer Establishments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/BZA010216 (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
 93. See generally Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want to Be a 
Lawyer? The Quest for Professional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2289, 2311 (2010) (describing career paths of laid-off attorneys). 
 94. The growth in employment, if any, does not appear to be matched by gains in 
terms of revenue. See Total Revenue for Other Legal Services, Establishments Subject to 
Federal Income Tax, Employer Firms, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=krxL (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2019) (comparing total revenue of all “Offices of Lawyers” versus total 
revenue of “All Other Legal Services”). 
 95. See NAICS Code 541199 All Other Legal Services, SICCODE.COM, 
https://siccode.com/en/naicscodes/541199/all-other-legal-services (last visited Mar. 29, 
2019). 
 96. See GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS: UNDERSTANDING THE GROWTH AND BENEFITS OF 
THESE NEW LEGAL PROVIDERS 4 (2017), https://www.2civility.org/wp-
content/uploads/Alternative-Legal-Service-Providers.pdf.  
 97. Id. (noting the different types of ALSPs). 
 98. Author’s calculations drawn from Wage and Salary Accruals Per Full-Time 
Equivalent Employee: Domestic Private Industries, FRED, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/J4422C0A052NBEA (last visited April 11, 2019). 
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substantially higher growth than nonlawyers.99 By way of contrast, the average 
American private sector employee saw his or her earnings grow only from $35,000 
to $59,000 over the same time period. 
Table 3 
 
One limitation of the analysis to this juncture is that the foregoing figures 
do not take into account the many lawyers who are self-employed. It is also possible 
that the analysis masks the degree to which specific groups of attorneys are being 
impacted by automation. Commentators have speculated about the plight of solo 
practitioners and new attorneys in particular.100 
Reliable income data for these categories of attorneys are not available at 
the national level. However, statewide data is available and provides some insight. 
For example, the State Bar of Texas, the second largest organized bar association in 
the United States, has periodically collected income data from its members since 
2005.101 Table 4 compares median incomes for all full-time attorneys, solo 
practitioners, and new attorneys—attorneys who have been practicing for two or 
                                                                                                                
 99. According to BLS data, lawyers who worked in the legal services industry saw 
their incomes increase from $96,120 on average in 2000 to $141,890 in 2017; by comparison, 
paralegals’ incomes grew from $38,020 in 2000 to $50,410 in 2017. Compare 2000 
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey with 2017 Occupational Employment Statistics 
Survey, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm (last modified March 29, 
2019). 
 100. See e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, A Glass Half-Full Look at the Changes in the 
Legal Market, 38 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 28, 29, 33 (2014); Deborah Merritt, What 
Happened to the Class of 2010? Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal 
Profession, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1104–05 (2014). 
 101. To practice law within the State of Texas, one must maintain active 
membership in the State Bar. TEX. GOV’T. CODE § 81.051. 
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fewer years—for the years 2005, 2011, and 2017.102 Focusing on these years is 
instructive because they encompass the years leading to the boom, recession, and 
recovery.103 
Table 4 
 
As Table 4 shows, the median income of full-time Texas private 
practitioners rose slightly from 2005 to 2017. However, growth was unsteady as the 
median income fell by over $7,000 from 2005 to 2011, before increasing by nearly 
$12,000 from 2011 to 2017. This trend is consistent with the postrecession recovery 
seen in Tables 2 and 3. On the whole, private practitioners’ real wages have fallen 
slightly from 2005. Solo practitioners were not as affected by the recession and have 
seen an increase in their median incomes of over $21,000 since 2005, outpacing 
inflation. 
Less experienced attorneys’ economic prospects have varied greatly across 
this time period. The median income of a Texas private practitioner with zero to two 
years’ experience in 2011 was approximately $25,000 less than it was in 2005. 
However, by 2017, these attorneys’ incomes rebounded such that they earned nearly 
$15,000 more than they did in 2005. This nevertheless represents a small decline in 
real wages from 2005. 
Although automation cannot be excluded as a cause of the modest income 
growth shown in Table 4, there are reasons to doubt its impact. From an economic 
perspective, the replacement of newer attorneys—whose incomes were most 
impacted by the recession as indicated in Table 4—would also have been less 
beneficial for firms than the replacement of middle-aged (and higher-paid) 
attorneys.104 Tasks, such as document review, that have become increasingly 
                                                                                                                
 102. Author’s calculations based on survey data from members of the State Bar of 
Texas (on file with author). 
 103. See 2015 Economic Growth Strongest Since 2005, REUTERS (July 28, 2017, 
5:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-gdp/2015-economic-growth-
strongest-since-2005-idUSKBN1AD1JM. 
 104. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Secular Stagnation? The Effect of 
Aging on Economic Growth in the Age of Automation 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
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automated are, as noted above, a small part of most attorneys’ day-to-day tasks, and 
law firms outsourced such tasks to low-paid contract attorneys long before the 
recession.105 Lastly, historically, law firms have been reluctant to invest in new 
technology, and there is no evidence that they made substantial outlays in the midst 
of a cataclysmic economic downturn that decimated profits.106 
A more plausible explanation for the tepid income growth, particularly 
among younger attorneys, is that it is a function of the 2008 recession.107 The 
recession dampened demand for high-end legal work, allowing corporate clients to 
insist on various types of cost-cutting, including the exclusion of junior attorneys 
from matters.108 Rather than sacrificing profits, firms laid-off less experienced 
attorneys, cut compensation, and have only recently begun to revert to prerecession 
norms in hiring.109 
Employment and wages in the legal sector have risen steadily over time, 
particularly for attorneys. However, the slow growth in median wages shown in state 
data bears scrutiny. If wages were to continue to stagnate and even fall, this would 
be evidence that automation in the legal sector is reducing demand for attorneys.110 
III. LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS? 
Thus far, this Article has maintained that the threat posed by intelligent 
machines has been overstated and fails to account for artificial intelligence’s 
                                                                                                                
Paper 23077, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23077.pdf (documenting that automation 
is more prevalent when there is a shortage of newer workers to replace older ones). 
 105.  See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 531–32. For a discussion of the rise of 
contract-attorney work, see R.A. BROOKS, CHEAPER BY THE HOUR: TEMPORARY LAWYERS AND 
THE DEPROFESSIONALIZATION OF LAW (2012). 
 106. Law firms, unlike most other businesses, are not permitted to accept 
investment from nonlawyers. This limits their ability to invest in technology as any outlays 
will have to come from the partners themselves. See Edward S. Adams & John H. 
Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in 
Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30 (1998). 
 107. See, e.g., Hoynes et al., Who Suffers During Recessions?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 
27, 45 (2012); Philip Oreopoulous et al., The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of 
Graduating in a Recession, 4 AM. ECON. J, 1, 3 (2012) (“The persistent effects from adverse 
labor market conditions are much larger for individuals in the first year of their careers than 
for individuals with just a few years of experience.”). 
 108. See Remus & Levy, supra note 4, at 531; see also Douglas R. Richmond, The 
Contemporary Legal Environment and Employment Claims Against Law Firms, 43 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 471, 489 (2011) (noting that firms justified layoffs of junior attorneys and 
compensation cuts as mandated by clients even though “clients simply want cheaper sausage-
they do not care how it is made”). 
 109. See Richmond, supra note 108, at 488–90. The nation’s largest law firms 
recently increased starting-associate salaries to $190,000, the second increase since the 
recession. See Sarah Randazzo, Starting Law Firm Associate Salaries Hit $190,000, WALL 
ST. J. (June 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/starting-law-firm-associate-salaries-hit-
190-000-1528813210. 
 110. See also Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 29, at 11 (positing that automation 
via artificial intelligence is associated with reduced demand for labor and lower wages). 
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limitations. That legal work is increasingly being automated is also inconsistent with 
most economic data. This Part contends that important policy considerations also 
counsel against replacing lawyers with intelligent machines in law, even if technical 
hurdles can be overcome. 
One consideration is largely practical. Intelligent machines pose a 
challenge to the dominant liability regime.111 If lawyers fail to deliver competent 
legal services to their clients, they are subject to ethical discipline as well as 
malpractice suits.112 Their responsibility can extend to the actions of third parties 
that are involved in the provision of legal services.113 When lawyer robots err, who 
should be held responsible and compensate injured clients?114  
What complicates such questions is that artificial intelligence is a “fluid 
system”; engineers periodically update software, but the system evolves on its own 
as it encounters more data.115 Uncertainty over liability and remedies may chill the 
adoption of artificial intelligence in law but may also lead to a regime where the 
lawyer remains the fulcrum of the legal representation, with ultimate responsibility 
for the services provided, although most of the day-to-day work would be performed 
                                                                                                                
 111. The literature on artificial intelligence and the appropriate liability regime is 
voluminous. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Simpler World? On Pruning Risks and 
Harvesting Fruits in an Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 27 
(2017); Curtis E. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 147, 147 (1996). 
 112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1; McKnight v. Dean, 270 F.3d 
513, 518 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Legal malpractice is not a failure to be brilliant, but a failure to 
come up to even a minimum standard of professional competence.”). 
 113. For rules governing lawyers and nonlawyers within the firm, see MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. r. 5.3(b) & (c). But lawyers are also responsible for the actions 
of lawyers and nonlawyers outside the firm. See, e.g., VA Legal Eth. Op. 1850, 2010 WL 
5545407, *4 (Jan. 1, 2010) (“The lawyer must be able to adequately supervise the nonlawyer 
if the work is outsourced.”); Nebraska Ethics Advisory Opinion for Lawyers No. 10-03, 2010 
WL 11064777, *3 (NE. Jud. Eth. Comm. Jan. 1, 2010) (“A lawyer who accepts assignments 
or referrals from a legal service plan or referrals from a lawyer referral service must act 
reasonably to assure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer’s 
professional obligations.”). For a discussion of the liability of online providers of legal 
services such as LegalZoom, see Benjamin A. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability 
Standards for On-Line Providers, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541 (2015). 
 114. There may also be the possibility of imposing penalties directly on the robots. 
See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots 90–93 (Stan. Law and Econ. Olin, 
Working Paper No. 523, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3223621##. For a discussion of the 
procedural challenges associated with imposing liability on robots, see generally Roger 
Michalski, How to Sue a Robot, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 1021.   
 115. Karnow, supra note 111, at 159; see Iria Giuffrida, Fredric Lederer & Nicolas 
Vermeys, A Legal Perspective on the Trials and Tribulations of AI: How Artificial 
Intelligence, the Internet of Things, Smart Contracts, and Other Technologies Will Affect the 
Law, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 753 (2018). 
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by intelligent machines.116 Under this scenario, demand for lawyers would not 
necessarily decrease if the cost of legal services were to fall such that more people 
would seek legal assistance.117 
Yet, the lawyer’s role should not be reduced to that of “cheapest cost 
avoider” in the delivery of legal services.118 To be sure, clients turn to lawyers 
because they need legal services, and they might not be overly concerned if a 
machine, rather than a lawyer, completes much of the work. Sophisticated corporate 
clients, in particular, are likely to negotiate warranties and other protections into 
their engagements to shield themselves from any errors resulting from the use of 
artificial intelligence.119 Ordinary individuals are not in a position to negotiate these 
protections or to assess the quality of the legal services they receive, which explains, 
in part, the rise of attorney licensing.120 
But the attorney–client relationship is, at its core, dialectical.121 Regardless 
of their level of sophistication, clients often do not have clear objectives and require 
assistance in shaping them.122 Clients also sometimes misunderstand the legal 
system and do not view their situations, including any wrongs they may have 
                                                                                                                
 116. Lawyers already have an obligation to be familiar with technological changes 
relevant to their legal practices, which will eventually include artificial intelligence. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8. 
 117. See also Barton, supra note 100, at 36–38 (examining the impact of technology 
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suffered, in legalistic terms.123 A fully autonomous, composed, and decided client 
may not require the counseling of an attorney, but that is not the messy reality of the 
law as lived.124 
Conceiving of “legal assistance” as a transaction cost to be minimized 
through technology or otherwise is equally problematic.125 Historically, lawyers 
have safeguarded the public interest while pursuing their clients’ objectives.126 This 
continues to be a fixture of many types of legal practice. For example, prosecutors 
do not merely seek convictions on behalf of the state; they are required to ensure 
that the accused is “accorded procedural justice.”127 Family lawyers are exhorted to 
consider the welfare of the children.128 Corporate lawyers bridge the gap between 
an unfettered free market and the highly regulated market that exists in the real 
world129 and also mitigate negative externalities associated with their clients’ 
conduct.130 The former general counsel of General Electric has described the 
corporate lawyer’s role thusly: 
[The] ideal is that of a genuinely independent advisor who occupies 
a dual role: he not only guides clients through the maze of law and 
regulation to help realize the company’s profit goals but also 
affirmatively promotes the company’s compliance with law and 
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fosters cooperation with other companies to engage in collective 
action for the public good.131 
One especially vital responsibility of attorneys is to push back against 
clients’ unlawful and misguided ends.132 In this regard, the lawyer is a gatekeeper 
who functions as a “buffer between the illegitimate desires of his client and the 
social interest.”133 Lawyers sometimes fail to abide by their gatekeeping obligations, 
as high-profile failures, like the Enron bankruptcy, indicate.134 But the expectation 
that attorneys will gatekeep is ubiquitous and applies to matters ranging from private 
securities offerings to personal-injury cases.135 
An intelligent machine may be able to determine if a course of conduct is 
unlawful; it may also be able to calculate the probability that any misconduct will 
be detected. What it cannot do is fulfill the other crucial “half” of a lawyer’s role: 
shaming and persuading clients and would-be clients “that they are damned fools 
and should stop.”136 As David Luban has explained, intelligent machines lack 
emotional intelligence and moral authority and cannot buttress legal and non-legal 
considerations to exhort clients to act in accordance with the law.137  
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To illustrate the ramifications of substituting machines for attorneys, 
consider DoNotPay, a smartphone application that assists users in fighting parking 
tickets.138 DoNotPay suggests various defenses for parking violations and prepares 
a filing based on the user’s inputs.139 One such defense is that the user was facing a 
medical emergency at the time of the alleged violation.140 Although a small number 
of individuals may park illegally because of medical emergencies, the reality is that 
any unscrupulous DoNotPay user can obtain the app’s assistance to raise the 
“medical emergency” defense.141 DoNotPay, unlike a lawyer, has no obligation to 
weed out illegitimate defenses or dissuade the user from lying as part of his or her 
appeal of a ticket.142 Rather, users agree to indemnify DoNotPay in connection with 
claims that arise from the user’s misdeeds.143 DoNotPay aspires to migrate into 
family law and other practice areas.144 
Parking disputes are admittedly low stakes, but even in traffic court, truth 
and justice matter. One can conceive of a future where litigants, assisted by apps 
utilizing artificial intelligence, flood real (or virtual) courts with unsustainable 
claims, with harried judges left to separate the wheat from the chafe.145 That some 
courts operate in this manner already—albeit without the involvement of intelligent 
machines—does not mean that society should emulate and expand upon these 
flawed models.146 
Attorneys also differ from intelligent machines in another crucial respect: 
they can explain themselves. In offering legal advice to clients, lawyers articulate 
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reasons for their positions; the reasons justify the conclusions reached.147 Reason-
giving recognizes the autonomy of the client and also ensures accountability and 
transparency.148 The attorney can be judged based not only on the outcome obtained 
for the attorney but also on the reasoning that led to the outcome. If the reasoning is 
unconvincing or faulty, the client can push back against the attorney or choose to 
terminate the representation. 
Intelligent machines—especially advanced ones—do not provide reasons 
for their decisions.149 Their reasons are inscrutable even to their creators150 because 
they alter their programming as they “learn” more data.151 Some degree of opacity 
is inevitable and perhaps welcome: the public is generally unconcerned with the 
inner workings of email spam filters.152 But when rights and liabilities are 
concerned, this inscrutability is highly problematic. Harry Surden writes: 
Articulated rationale is a central tenet of legal decision-making, 
particularly when decisions involve the deprivation of liberty or 
property. However, to the extent that legal officials are assisted by 
artificial intelligence systems that have core interpretability 
limitations, such articulable rationales may not be possible, 
undermining central legal norms . . . [S]uch such uninterpretable 
mathematical models may further mask underlying, and undesirable, 
biases . . . .153 
No matter how sophisticated the artificial intelligence, clients cannot be expected to 
conform their activities pursuant to reasoning that they cannot access, let alone 
comprehend.154 
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One possible counterargument is that for most legal matters, clients are 
simply seeking a sense of the legal terrain. They are uninterested in reasons; they 
merely seek to know whether their actions are illegal and their potential liabilities. 
But, even accepting this premise,155 clients do certainly have an interest in accurate 
legal assessments. Because clients can neither monitor nor comprehend intelligent 
machines’ reasoning, they will be unable to discern whether their robot advisors 
have erred, and any flaws could go uncorrected. 
A legal system dominated by intelligent machines would differ radically 
from one populated by lawyers. In theory, such a system would be more accessible 
if everyone were guaranteed equal access to these machines.156 But attorneys sustain 
the legal system by forming trusting relationships with their clients and ensuring 
compliance with the law. Core values, such as truth and transparency in the legal 
system, would be jeopardized without them. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the discourse surrounding artificial intelligence and the law 
provides an impoverished understanding of artificial intelligence and lawyers’ 
actual work. Artificial intelligence is changing legal practice, as it is other human 
domains, but most legal tasks that occupy lawyers’ days do not lend themselves to 
automation. The rise of intelligent machines should induce anxiety only among 
segments of the legal profession that provide routinized and formulaic solutions for 
clients. 
In some respects, the legal services market has been slow to recover from 
the 2008 recession, and this has coincided with the emergence of alternative legal 
service providers. However, these developments should not obscure that lawyer 
employment and wages have been growing steadily over the last twenty years, which 
would not be the case if automation were taking hold. To the extent that automation 
has had a negative impact on the legal sector, it has been on nonlawyer staff. 
Artificial intelligence is likely to benefit lawyers by freeing them from low-margin, 
unrewarding work, such as document review, and allowing them to concentrate on 
their core duties: advising and advocating for clients. 
Whatever the eventual capabilities of intelligent machines, lawyers fulfill 
an invaluable and multi-faceted role in the legal system. They support and counsel 
their clients, effectuate compliance with the law, and help to safeguard the public 
interest. Lawyers are also responsible and can be held accountable for deficient 
representation. The legal system is not a parking ticket to be gamed, and reckless 
automation of whole swaths of legal work is bound to destabilize the system. Rather 
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than fearing obsolescence, lawyers should work in tandem with intelligent machines 
to better serve the public.  
